36 ideas
| 192 | Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato] |
| 190 | If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato] |
| 20184 | The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato] |
| 20185 | The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato] |
| 6230 | If the soul were a tabula rasa, with no innate ideas, there could be no moral goodness or justice [Cudworth] |
| 6228 | Senses cannot judge one another, so what judges senses cannot be a sense, but must be superior [Cudworth] |
| 191 | Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato] |
| 6229 | Sense is fixed in the material form, and so can't grasp abstract universals [Cudworth] |
| 20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20019 | Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20021 | Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20031 | On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20028 | Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20027 | If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20016 | Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20017 | Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20018 | Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20012 | Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 203 | Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato] |
| 20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 6227 | Keeping promises and contracts is an obligation of natural justice [Cudworth] |
| 202 | No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato] |
| 193 | Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato] |
| 197 | Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato] |
| 200 | People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato] |
| 188 | Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato] |
| 204 | Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato] |
| 189 | If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato] |
| 6225 | Obligation to obey all positive laws is older than all laws [Cudworth] |
| 6224 | An omnipotent will cannot make two things equal or alike if they aren't [Cudworth] |
| 6223 | If the will and pleasure of God controls justice, then anything wicked or unjust would become good if God commanded it [Cudworth] |
| 6226 | The requirement that God must be obeyed must precede any authority of God's commands [Cudworth] |